Ivo Daalder, CEO of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and former U.S. ambassador to NATO, alongside Camille Grand, a distinguished policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and former assistant secretary general for defense investment at NATO, and Daniela Schwarzer, executive board member of Bertelsmann Stiftung and former director of the German Council on Foreign Relations, co-chaired a Belfer Center task force focused on strengthening the European pillar in transatlantic relations.
U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s recent speech at the Munich Security Conference has sparked shock and indignation, highlighting a critical reality: the growing divide between Europe and President Donald Trump’s America. This situation necessitates a reassessment of the terms governing the transatlantic alliance.
European leaders are increasingly aware that reliance on U.S. support for security may no longer be viable. Rumors of U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe were prevalent in Munich, underscoring this concern.
The reality is that Europe has been overly dependent on U.S. security support for far too long. It must take greater responsibility for its defense in light of a fundamentally altered security environment and a waning American commitment to Europe’s defense.
Europe faces significant challenges. Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and its hybrid operations across the continent pose direct threats to European security. Yet, the capability of the bloc to support Ukraine without substantial U.S. assistance is limited, as is its ability to ensure its own defense—particularly if Russia were to prevail in the conflict.
The European Union must clearly understand the imperative: it needs to invest significantly more in defense than currently planned and develop a military capable of operating at high readiness levels. This includes the technical, operational, and strategic agility necessary to counter the military threats it now faces. A failure to invest adequately in defense will leave Europe vulnerable to an expanding Russia and other potential threats, without guaranteed U.S. support.
For Europe to encourage Washington’s continued commitment to transatlantic security, it must be willing and capable of doing much more for its own defense. A true and equitable partnership is essential for maintaining the value of this historic alliance.
Recognizing the call for increased European investment in defense—and for sustained, yet calibrated, American investment in the transatlantic alliance—faces significant political and economic challenges.
In many European nations, economic growth is sluggish, budgets are constrained, public opinion is fragmented, and socioeconomic models are under scrutiny. Concurrently, the Trump administration in Washington is reassessing Europe’s role in a complex global strategic landscape, likely leading to differences with Europe on issues including Ukraine, Russia, China, trade, and climate change.
Despite these real challenges, inaction is not an option. With new leadership emerging in Washington, Brussels, and various European capitals, now is the opportune moment to reevaluate the transatlantic partnership and work towards building a robust European defense pillar. In collaboration with former officials from Europe, the U.S., and NATO, we have outlined a major agenda for establishing this pillar and reinforcing transatlantic security.
Key steps for Europe include increasing defense spending to align with Cold War averages (above 3 percent) to facilitate the development of a large, capable, and ready military force, addressing two decades of underinvestment. European militaries must also enhance the readiness of their combat forces, enabling the deployment of over 300,000 troops within 30 days and an additional 400,000 within six months.
Europe must also acquire strategic enablers, including aerial refueling capabilities, heavy lift, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets, electronic warfare, airborne surveillance, maritime patrol, space-based capabilities, and air/missile defenses. Building a six-month inventory of ammunition, fuel, and spare parts at high consumption rates is essential.
Lastly, addressing the challenges posed by Europe’s fragmented arms industry is crucial for ensuring timely delivery of capabilities and efficient utilization of available resources.
The U.S. should continue to prioritize transatlantic and European security as a cornerstone of its national security strategy by maintaining a military presence in Europe, including a significant range of land, air, and naval capabilities. The Trump administration should reaffirm the U.S. commitment to collective defense under NATO, including nuclear deterrence.
Additionally, Washington must reassess its approach to arms cooperation—such as export controls and access to the U.S. market—to promote collaboration with European allies and enhance their capabilities as part of a sustainable transatlantic alliance.
To shift the burden-sharing debate, a fundamentally new and sustainable transatlantic bargain is necessary. A Europe that assumes greater responsibility for its own security and for global stability would bolster the argument that NATO is beneficial for the U.S. If this fails to persuade Washington, Europe must at least enhance its own defense capabilities.
